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Abstract. Notions of asimulation and k-asimulation introduced in [Olkhovikov 2011]
are extended onto the level of predicate logic. We then prove that a first-
order formula is equivalent to a standard translation of an intuitionistic
predicate formula iff it is invariant with respect to k-asimulations for some
k, and then that a first-order formula is equivalent to a standard trans-
lation of an intuitionistic predicate formula iff it is invariant with respect
to asimulations. Finally, it is proved that a first-order formula is equiva-
lent to a standard translation of an intuitionistic predicate formula over a
class of intuitionistic models (intuitionistic models with constant domain)
iff it is invariant with respect to asimulations between intuitionistic models
(intuitionistic models with constant domain).
Van Benthem’s well-known modal characterization theorem shows that expressive
power of modal propositional logic as a fragment of first-order logic can be described
via the notion of bisimulation invariance. Moreover, it is known that modal predicate
logic, initially considered as an extension of first-order logic, can also be viewed as
its fragment, although somewhat bigger than the fragment induced by propositional
modal logic. Expressive power of modal predicate logic, from this vantage point, is
described by the notion of world-object bisimulation which appears to be a rather direct
combination of bisimulation and partial isomorphism (see, e. g. [Van Benthem 2010, p.
124, Theorem 21]).
Although intuitionistic logic has been treated as a fragment of modal logic for
quite a long while, results analogous to propositional and predicate version of Van
Benthem’s modal characterization theorem were not obtained for it until recently. In
[Olkhovikov 2011] we filled this gap for intuitionistic propositional logic. In this paper
we introduced the notion of asimulation and its parametrized version, k-asimulation,
and showed that they can be used to characterize expressive power of intuitionistic
propositional logic in much the same way bisimulation and k-bisimulation are used to
characterize modal propositional logic. In this paper we do the same job for intuition-
istic predicate logic without identity.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Starting from some notational conventions and
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preliminary remarks in section 1, we then define a predicate version of k-asimulation
and move on to the proof of a ‘parametrized’ version of model-theoretic characteri-
zation of intuitionistic predicate logic in section 2. Then, in section 3, we introduce
the predicate version of asimulation and prove the full unparametrized counterpart to
Theorem 21 of [Van Benthem 2010]. In section 4 we discuss possibilities of restriction
of the latter result to special subclasses of first-order models and the final sections
contains some conclusions, and mentions possible directions of further research.
1 Preliminaries
We take N to be the set of natural numbers without 0. A formula is a formula
of classical predicate logic with identity whose predicate letters are in a vocabulary
Σ = {R2, E2 } ∪ {Pnm | n,m ∈ N }, where the upper subscript denotes the arity of the
letter, so 0-ary predicate letters or propositional letters are not allowed. We refer to
formulas with Greek letters distinct from α and β, and to sets of formulas with upper-
case Greek letters distinct from Σ and Θ. We refer to variables with letters w, x, y, z,
sometimes using primes or subscripts. If ϕ is a formula, then we associate with it the
following finite vocabulary Σϕ ⊆ Σ such that Σϕ = {R
2, E2 }∪{P ji | P
j
i occurs in ϕ }.
More generally, we refer with Θ to an arbitrary subset of Σ such that R2, E2 ∈ Θ.
If ψ is a formula and every predicate letter occurring in ψ is in Θ, then we call ψ a
Θ-formula.
We refer to sequence x1, . . . , xn of any objects as x¯n. We denote ordered pair of
ordered n-tuple (x¯n) and ordered m-tuple (y¯m) by (x¯n; y¯m). We identify ordered 1-
tuple with its only member. We denote the ordered 0-tuple by Λ. If all free variables
of a formula ϕ (set of formulas Γ) are among x¯n, we write ϕ(x¯n) (Γ(x¯n)).
For a binary relation S and any objects s, t we abbreviate the fact that sSt ∧ tSs
by sSˆt.
We will denote models of classical predicate logic by letters M , N or α, β. We refer
to the domain of a model M by D(M). For n ≥ 0 by an n-ary evaluation Θ-point
we mean a sequence (M,a, b¯n) such that M is a Θ-model and (a, b¯n) is a sequence of
elements of D(M). If (M,a, b¯n) is an n-ary evaluation point then we say that ϕ(x, w¯n)
is true at (M,a, b¯n) and write M,a, b¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n) iff for any variable assignment f in
M such that f(x) = a, f(wi) = bi for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have M, f |= ϕ(x, w¯n). It
follows from this convention that truth of a formula ϕ(x, w¯n) at an n-ary evaluation
point is to some extent independent of a choice of its free variables.
An intuitionistic formula is a formula of intuitionistic predicate logic without iden-
tity. Propositional (i. e. 0-ary predicate) letters are allowed. We refer to intuitionistic
formulas with letters i, j, k, possibly with primes or subscripts. Their variables are
represented in the same way as in formulas. We assume a standard Kripke semantics
for intuitionistic predicate logic where in a given world a predicate letter might be true
only for some tuples of objects present in this world.
If x is an individual variable in a first-order language, then by a standard x-
translation of intuitionistic formulas into formulas we mean the following map ST
defined by induction on the complexity of the corresponding intuitionistic formula.
First we assume some map of intuitionistic predicate letters into classical ones which
correlates with each n-ary intuitionistic predicate letter P an (n+1)-ary classical pred-
icate letter P ′ distinct from R2, E2. We assume that this correlation is surjective, that
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is, that every predicate letter in Σ distinct from R2, E2 is standard translation of an
intuitionistic predicate letter. Then our induction goes as follows:
ST (P (w¯n), x) = P
′(x, w¯n);
ST (⊥, x) = (x 6= x);
ST (i(w¯n) ∧ j(w¯n), x) = ST (i(w¯n), x) ∧ ST (j(w¯n), x);
ST (i(w¯n) ∨ j(w¯n), x) = ST (i(w¯n), x) ∨ ST (j(w¯n), x);
ST (i(w¯n)→ j(w¯n), x) = ∀y(R(x, y)→ (ST (i(w¯n), y)→ ST (j(w¯n), y)));
ST (∃w′i(w¯n, w
′), x) = ∃w′(E(x,w′) ∧ ST (i(w¯n, w
′), x));
ST (∀w′i(w¯n, w
′), x) = ∀yw′((R(x, y) ∧ E(y, w′))→ ST (i(w¯n, w
′), y)).
Standard conditions are imposed on the variables x, y, w¯n, w
′.
By degree of a formula we mean the greatest number of nested quantifiers occurring
in it. A degree of a formula ϕ is denoted by r(ϕ). Its formal definition by induction
on the complexity of ϕ goes as follows:
r(ϕ) = 0 for atomic ϕ
r(¬ϕ) = r(ϕ)
r(ϕ ◦ ψ) = max(r(ϕ), r(ψ)) for ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,→}
r(Qxϕ) = r(ϕ) + 1 for Q ∈ { ∀, ∃ }
If k ∈ N and ϕ(x, w¯n) is a Θ-formula such that r(ϕ) ≤ k, then ϕ is a (Θ, (x, w¯n), k)-
formula.
2 Characterization of intuitionistic predicate formu-
las via k-asimulations
We begin with extending our previous notion of k-asimulation to cover the general
case of predicate logic.
Definition 1. Let (M,a, b¯n), (N, c, d¯n) be two n-ary evaluation Θ-points. A binary
relation
A ⊆
⋃
m≥1,l≥0
(((D(M)m×D(M)l)×(D(N)m×D(N)l))∪((D(N)m×D(N)l)×(D(M)m×D(M)l))),
is called 〈(M,a, b¯n), (N, c, d¯n)〉k-asimulation iff (a; b¯n)A(c; d¯n) and for any α, β ∈ {M,N },
any (a¯′m, a
′; b¯′l) ∈ D(α)
m+1 × D(α)l, (c¯′m, c
′; d¯′l) ∈ D(β)
m+1 ×D(β)l, whenever we
have (a¯′m, a
′; b¯′l)A(c¯′m, c
′; d¯′l), the following conditions hold:
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∀P ∈ Θ \ {R2, E2 }(α, a′, b¯′l |= P (x, w¯l)⇒ β, c
′, d¯′l |= P (x, w¯l)) (1)
(m+ l < n+ k ∧ c′′ ∈ D(β) ∧ c′Rβc′′)⇒
⇒ ∃a′′ ∈ D(α)(a′Rαa′′ ∧ (c¯′m, c
′, c′′; d¯′l)Aˆ(a¯′m, a
′, a′′; b¯′l)); (2)
(m+ l < n+ k ∧ b′′ ∈ D(α) ∧Eα(a′, b′′))⇒
⇒ ∃d′′ ∈ D(β)(Eβ(c′, d′′) ∧ (a¯′m, a
′; b¯′l, b
′′)A(c¯′m, c
′; d¯′l, d
′′)); (3)
(m+ l + 1 < n+ k ∧ c′′, d′′ ∈ D(β) ∧ c′Rβc′′ ∧Eβ(c′′, d′′))⇒
⇒ ∃a′′, b′′ ∈ D(α)(a′Rαa′′ ∧ Eα(a′′, b′′) ∧ (a¯′m, a
′, a′′; b¯′l, b
′′)A(c¯′m, c
′, c′′; d¯′l, d
′′)).
(4)
Lemma 1. Let ϕ(x, w¯n) = ST (i(w¯n), x) for some intuitionistic formula i(w¯n), and let
r(ϕ) = k. Let Σϕ ⊆ Θ, let (M, t, u¯s), (N, t
′, u¯′s) be two s-ary evaluation Θ-points, and
let A be an 〈(M, t, u¯s), (N, t
′, u¯′s)〉p-asimulation. Then
∀α, β ∈ {M,N }∀(a¯m, a; b¯n) ∈ (D(α)
m+1 ×D(α)n)∀(c¯m, c; d¯n) ∈ (D(β)
m+1 ×D(β)n)
(((a¯m, a; b¯n)A(c¯m, c; d¯n) ∧m+ n+ k ≤ p+ s ∧ α, a, b¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n)⇒ β, c, d¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n)).
Proof. We proceed by induction on the complexity of i. In what follows we will abbre-
viate the induction hypothesis by IH.
Basis. Let i(w¯n) = P (w¯n). Then ϕ(x, w¯n) = P
′(x, w¯n) and we reason as follows:
(a¯m, a; b¯n)A(c¯m, c; d¯n) (premise) (5)
α, a, b¯n |= P
′(x, w¯n) (premise) (6)
P ′ ∈ Θ \ {R2, E2 } (by Σϕ ⊆ Σ
′) (7)
∀Q ∈ Θ \ {R2, E2 }(α, a, b¯n |= Q(x, w¯n)⇒ β, c, d¯n |= Q(x, w¯n)) (from (5) by (1))
(8)
α, a, b¯n |= P
′(x, w¯n)⇒ β, b, d¯n |= P
′(x, w¯n) (from (7) and (8))
(9)
β, c, d¯n |= P
′(x, w¯n) (from (6) and (9))
(10)
The case i = ⊥ is obvious.
Induction step.
Case 1. Let i(w¯n) = j(w¯n)∧ k(w¯n). Then ϕ(x, w¯n) = ST (j(w¯n), x)∧ST (k(w¯n), x)
and we reason as follows:
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(a¯m, a; b¯n)A(c¯m, c; d¯n) (premise) (11)
α, a, b¯n |= ST (j(w¯n), x) ∧ ST (k(w¯n), x) (premise) (12)
m+ n+ r(ST (j(w¯n), x) ∧ ST (k(w¯n), x)) ≤ p+ s (premise) (13)
r(ST (j(w¯n), x)) ≤ r(ST (j(w¯n), x) ∧ ST (k(w¯n), x)) (by df of r) (14)
r(ST (k(w¯n), x)) ≤ r(ST (j(w¯n), x) ∧ ST (k(w¯n), x)) (by df of r) (15)
α, a, b¯n |= ST (j(w¯n), x) (from (12)) (16)
α, a, b¯n |= ST (k(w¯n), x) (from (12)) (17)
m+ n+ r(ST (j(w¯n), x)) ≤ p+ s (from (13) and (14)) (18)
m+ n+ r(ST (k(w¯n), x)) ≤ p+ s (from (13) and (15)) (19)
β, c, d¯n |= ST (j(w¯n), x) (from (11), (16) and (18) by IH)
(20)
β, c, d¯n |= ST (k(w¯n), x) (from (11), (17) and (19) by IH)
(21)
β, c, d¯n |= ST (j(w¯n), x) ∧ ST (k(w¯n), x) (from (20) and (21)) (22)
Case 2. Let i(w¯n) = j(w¯n)∨ k(w¯n). Then ϕ(x, w¯n) = ST (j(w¯n), x)∨ST (k(w¯n), x)
and we have then α, a, b¯n |= ST (j(w¯n), x) ∨ ST (k(w¯n), x). Assume, without a loss of
generality, that α, a, b¯n |= ST (j(w¯n), x). Then we reason as follows:
α, a, b¯n |= ST (j(w¯n), x) (premise) (23)
(a¯m, a; b¯n)A(c¯m, c; d¯n) (premise) (24)
m+ n+ r(ST (j(w¯n), x) ∨ ST (k(w¯n), x)) ≤ p+ s (premise) (25)
r(ST (j(w¯n), x)) ≤ r(ST (j(w¯n), x) ∨ ST (k(w¯n), x)) (by df of r) (26)
m+ n+ r(ST (j(w¯n), x)) ≤ p+ s (from (25) and (26)) (27)
β, c, d¯n |= ST (j(w¯n), x) (from (23), (24) and (27) by IH)
(28)
β, c, d¯n |= ST (j(w¯n), x) ∨ ST (k(w¯n), x) (from (28)) (29)
Case 3. Let i(w¯n) = j(w¯n)→ k(w¯n). Then
ϕ(x, w¯n) = ∀y(R(x, y)→ (ST (j(w¯n), y)→ ST (k(w¯n), y))).
Let
α, a, b¯n |= ∀y(R(x, y)→ (ST (j(w¯n), y)→ ST (k(w¯n), y))),
and let
β, c, d¯n |= ∃y(R(x, y) ∧ (ST (j(w¯n), y) ∧ ¬ST (k(w¯n), y))).
This means that we can choose a c′ ∈ D(β) such that cRβc′ and β, c′, d¯n |= ST (j(w¯n), y)∧¬ST (k(w¯n), y).
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We now reason as follows:
β, c′, d¯n |= ST (j(w¯n), y) ∧ ¬ST (k(w¯n), y) (by choice of c
′) (30)
c′ ∈ D(β) ∧ cRβc′ (by choice of c′) (31)
(a¯m, a; b¯n)A(c¯m, c; d¯n) (premise) (32)
m+ n+ r(ϕ(x, w¯n)) ≤ p+ s (premise) (33)
r(ϕ(x, w¯n))) ≥ 1 (by df of r) (34)
m+ n < p+ s (from (33) and (34)) (35)
∃a′ ∈ D(α)(aRαa′ ∧ (c¯m, c, c
′; d¯n)Aˆ(a¯m, a, a
′; b¯n)) (from (31), (32) and (35) by(2))
(36)
Now choose an a′ for which (36) is satisfied; we add the premises following from our
choice of a′ and continue our reasoning as follows:
a′ ∈ D(α) ∧ aRαa′ (by choice of a′) (37)
(c¯m, c, c
′; d¯n)A(a¯m, a, a
′; b¯n) (by choice of a
′) (38)
(a¯m, a, a
′; b¯n)A(c¯m, c, c
′; d¯n) (by choice of a
′) (39)
r(ST (j(w¯n), y)) ≤ r(ϕ(x, w¯n))− 1 (by df of r) (40)
r(ST (k(w¯n), y)) ≤ r(ϕ(x, w¯n))− 1 (by df of r) (41)
m+ 1 + n+ r(ST (j(w¯n), y)) ≤ p+ s (from (33) and (40)) (42)
m+ 1 + n+ r(ST (k(w¯n), y)) ≤ p+ s (from (33) and (41)) (43)
α, a′, b¯n |= ST (j(w¯n), x) (from (30), (38), (42) by IH)
(44)
α, a′, b¯n |= ¬ST (k(w¯n), x) (from (30), (39), (43) by IH)
(45)
α, a′, b¯n |= ST (j(w¯n), y) ∧ ¬ST (k(w¯n), y) (from (44), (45)) (46)
α, a, b¯n |= ∃y(R(x, y) ∧ (ST (j(w¯n), y) ∧ ¬ST (k(w¯n), y))) (from (37) and (46)) (47)
The last line contradicts our initial assumption that
α, a, b¯n |= ∀y(R(x, y)→ (ST (j(w¯n), y)→ ST (k(w¯n), y))),
Case 4. Let i(w¯n) = ∃w
′j(w¯n, w
′). Then
ϕ(x, w¯n) = ∃w
′(E(x,w′) ∧ ST (j(w¯n, w
′), x)).
Let α, a, b¯n |= ∃w
′(E(x,w′) ∧ ST (j(w¯n, w
′), x)). This means that we can choose a
b′ ∈ D(α) such that aEαb′ and α, a, b¯n, b
′ |= ST (j(w¯n, w
′), x). We now reason as
Characterization of predicate intuitionistic formulas 7
follows:
α, a, b¯n, b
′ |= ST (j(w¯n, w
′), x) (by choice of b′) (48)
b′ ∈ D(α) ∧ Eα(a, b′) (by choice of b′) (49)
(a¯m, a; b¯n)A(c¯m, c; d¯n) (premise) (50)
m+ n+ r(ϕ(x, w¯n)) ≤ p+ s (premise) (51)
r(ϕ(x, w¯n)) ≥ 1 (by df of r) (52)
m+ n < p+ s (from (51) and (52)) (53)
∃d′ ∈ D(β)(Eβ(c, d′) ∧ (a¯m, a; b¯n, b
′)A(c¯m, c; d¯n, d
′)) (from (49), (50) and (53) by (3))
(54)
Now choose a d′ for which (54) is satisfied; we add the premises following from our
choice of d′ and continue our reasoning as follows:
d′ ∈ D(β) ∧ Eβ(c, d′) (by choice of d′) (55)
(a¯m, a; b¯n, b
′)A(c¯m, c; d¯n, d
′) (by choice of d′) (56)
r(ST (j(w¯n, w
′), x)) = r(ϕ(x, w¯n))− 1 (by df of r) (57)
m+ n+ 1 + r(ST (j(w¯n, w
′), x)) ≤ p+ s (from (51) and (57)) (58)
β, c, d¯n, d
′ |= ST (j(w¯n, w
′), x) (from (48), (56), (58) by IH) (59)
β, c, d¯n |= ∃w
′(E(x,w′) ∧ ST (j(w¯n, w
′), x)) (from (55) and (59)) (60)
Case 5. Let i(w¯n) = ∀w
′j(w¯n, w
′). Then
ϕ(x, w¯n) = ∀yw
′((R(x, y) ∧E(y, w′))→ ST (j(w¯n, w
′), y)).
Let
α, a, b¯n |= ∀yw
′((R(x, y) ∧ E(y, w′))→ ST (j(w¯n, w
′), y)),
and let
β, c, d¯n |= ∃yw
′((R(x, y) ∧ E(y, w′)) ∧ ¬ST (j(w¯n, w
′), y)).
The latter fact means that we can choose some c′, d′ ∈ D(β) such that cRβc′, Eβ(c′, d′),
and β, c′, d¯n, d
′ |= ¬ST (j(w¯n, w
′), y). We now reason as follows:
β, c′, d¯n, d
′ |= ¬ST (j(w¯n, w
′), y) (by choice of c′, d′) (61)
c′ ∈ D(β) ∧ cRβc′ (by choice of c′) (62)
d′ ∈ D(β) ∧Eβ(c′, d′) (by choice of c′, d′) (63)
(a¯m, a; b¯n)A(c¯m, c; d¯n) (premise) (64)
m+ n+ r(ϕ(x, w¯n)) ≤ p+ s (premise) (65)
r(ϕ(x, w¯n))) ≥ 2 (by df of r) (66)
m+ n+ 1 < p+ s (from (65) and (66)) (67)
∃a′b′ ∈ D(aRαa′ ∧ Eα(a′, b′) ∧ (a¯m, a, a
′; b¯n, b
′)A(c¯m, c, c
′; d¯n, d
′)) (68)
(from (62), (63), (64) and (67) by(4))
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Then choose a′, b′ ∈ D(α) for which (68) is satisfied. We add the premises following
from our choice of a′, b′ and continue our reasoning as follows:
a′ ∈ D(α) ∧ aRαa′ (by choice of a′) (69)
b′ ∈ D(α) ∧ Eα(a′, b′) (by choice of a′, b′) (70)
(a¯m, a, a
′; b¯n, b
′)A(c¯m, c, c
′; d¯n, d
′) (by choice of a′, b′) (71)
r(¬ST (j(w¯n, w
′), y)) = r(ϕ(x, w¯n))− 2 (by df of r) (72)
m+ 1+ n+ 1 + r(¬ST (j(w¯n, w
′), y)) ≤ p+ s (from (65) and (72)) (73)
α, a′, b¯n, b
′ |= ¬ST (j(w¯n, w
′), y) (from (61), (71), (73) by IH)
(74)
α, a, b¯n |= ∃yw
′((R(x, y) ∧ E(y, w′)) ∧ ¬ST (j(w¯n, w
′), y)) (from (69), (70) and (74))
(75)
The last line contradicts our initial assumption that
α, a, b¯n |= ∀yw
′((R(x, y) ∧ E(y, w′))→ ST (j(w¯n, w
′), y)).
Definition 2. A formula ϕ(x, w¯n) is invariant with respect to k-asimulations iff for
any Θ such that Σϕ ⊆ Θ, any two n-ary evaluation Θ-points (M,a, b¯n) and (N, c, d¯n),
if there exists a 〈(M,a, b¯n), (N, c, d¯n)〉k-asimulation A and M,a, b¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n), then
N, c, d¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n).
Corollary 1. If ϕ(x, w¯n) is a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula and
r(ϕ) = k, then ϕ(x, w¯n) is invariant with respect to k-asimulations.
Corollary 1 immediately follows from Lemma 1 setting α = M , β = N , m = 0,
p = k, t = a, u¯s = b¯n, t
′ = c, u¯′s = d¯n.
Before we state and prove our main result, we need to mention a fact from classical
model theory of first-order logic.
Lemma 2. For any finite Θ and any natural n, k there are, up to logical equivalence,
only finitely many (Θ, (x, w¯n), k)-formulas.
This fact is proved as Lemma 3.4 in [Ebbinghaus et al. 1984, pp. 189–190].
Definition 3. Let ϕ(x, w¯n) be a formula. A conjunction of (Σϕ, (x, w¯n), k)-formulas
Ψ(x, w¯n) is called a complete (ϕ, (x, w¯n), k)-conjunction iff (1) every conjunct in Ψ(x)
is a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula; and (2) there is an n-ary
evaluation point (M,a, b¯n) such that M,a, b¯n |= Ψ(x, w¯n) ∧ ϕ(x, w¯n) and for any
(Σϕ, (x, w¯n), k)-formula ψ(x, w¯n), if ψ(x, w¯n) is a standard x-translation of an intu-
itionistic formula and M,a, b¯n |= ψ(x, w¯n), then Ψ(x, w¯n) |= ψ(x, w¯n).
Lemma 3. For any formula ϕ(x, w¯n), any natural k, and any n-ary evaluation point
(M,a, b¯n) such that M,a, b¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n) there is a complete (ϕ, (x, w¯n), k)-conjunction
Ψ(x, w¯n) such that M,a, b¯n |= Ψ(x, w¯n) ∧ ϕ(x, w¯n).
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Proof. Let {ψ1(x, w¯n) . . . , ψn(x, w¯n), . . . } be the set of all (Σϕ, (x, w¯n), k)-formulas
that are standard x-translations of intuitionistic formulas true at (M,a, b¯n). This
set is non-empty since ST (⊥ → ⊥, x) will be true at (M,a, b¯n). Due to Lemma
2, we can choose in this set a non-empty finite subset {ψi1(x, w¯n) . . . , ψin(x, w¯n) }
such that any formula from the bigger set is logically equivalent to (and hence follows
from) a formula in this subset. Therefore, every formula in the bigger set follows from
ψi1(x, w¯n)∧ . . . ,∧ψin(x, w¯n) and we also haveM,a, b¯n |= ψi1(x, w¯n)∧ . . . ,∧ψin(x, w¯n),
therefore, ψi1(x, w¯n) ∧ . . . ,∧ψin(x, w¯n) is a complete (ϕ, (x, w¯n), k)-conjunction.
Lemma 4. For any formula ϕ(x, w¯n) and any natural k there are, up to logical equiv-
alence, only finitely many complete (ϕ, (x, w¯n), k)-conjunctions.
Proof. It suffices to observe that for any formula ϕ(x, w¯n) and any natural k, a complete
(ϕ, (x, w¯n), k)-conjunction is a (Σϕ, (x, w¯n), k)-formula. Our lemma then follows from
Lemma 2.
In what follows we adopt the following notation for the fact that for any sequence
(x, w¯n) of variables all (Σϕ, (x, w¯n), k)-formulas that are standard translations of intu-
itionistic formulas true at (M,a, b¯n), are also true at (N, c, d¯n):
(M,a, b¯n) ≤ϕ,n,k (N, c, d¯n).
Theorem 1. Let r(ϕ(x, w¯n)) = k and let ϕ(x, w¯n) be invariant with respect to k-
asimulations. Then ϕ(x, w¯n) is equivalent to a standard x-translation of an intuition-
istic formula.
Proof. We may assume that both ϕ(x) and ¬ϕ(x) are satisfiable, since both ⊥ and ⊤
are obviously invariant with respect to k-asimulations and we have, for example, the
following valid formulas:
⊥ ↔ ST (⊥, x),⊤ ↔ ST (⊥→ ⊥, x).
We may also assume that there are two complete (ϕ, (x, w¯n), k + 2)-conjunctions
Ψ(x, w¯n),Ψ
′(x, w¯n) such that Ψ
′(x, w¯n) |= Ψ(x, w¯n), and both formulas Ψ(x, w¯n)∧ϕ(x, w¯n)
and Ψ′(x, w¯n) ∧ ¬ϕ(x, w¯n) are satisfiable.
For suppose otherwise. Then take the set of all complete (ϕ, (x, w¯n), k+2)-conjunctions
Ψ(x, w¯n) such that the formula Ψ(x, w¯n) ∧ ϕ(x, w¯n) is satisfiable. This set is non-
empty, because ϕ(x, w¯n) is satisfiable, and by Lemma 3, it can be satisfied only
together with some complete (ϕ, (x, w¯n), k + 2)-conjunction. Now, using Lemma 4,
choose in it a finite non-empty subset {Ψi1(x, w¯n) . . . ,Ψin(x, w¯n) } such that any com-
plete (ϕ, (x, w¯n), k + 2)-conjunction is equivalent to an element of this subset. We
can show that ϕ(x, w¯n) is logically equivalent to Ψi1(x, w¯n) ∨ . . . ∨ Ψin(x, w¯n). In
fact, ifM,a, b¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n) then, by Lemma 3, at least one complete (ϕ, (x, w¯n), k+2)-
conjunction is true at (M,a, b¯n) and therefore, its equivalent in {Ψi1(x, w¯n) . . . ,Ψin(x, w¯n) }
is also true at (M,a, b¯n), and so, finally we haveM,a, b¯n |= Ψi1(x, w¯n)∨. . . ,∨Ψin(x, w¯n).
In the other direction, if M,a, b¯n |= Ψi1(x, w¯n) ∨ . . . ,∨Ψin(x, w¯n) then for some
1 ≤ j ≤ n we have M,a, b¯n |= Ψij (x, w¯n). Then, since Ψij (x, w¯n) |= Ψij (x, w¯n) and
since by the choice of Ψij (x, w¯n) the formula Ψij (x, w¯n)∧ϕ(x, w¯n) is satisfiable, so, by
our assumption, the formula Ψij (x, w¯n) ∧ ¬ϕ(x, w¯n) must be unsatisfiable, and hence
10 Grigory. K. Olkhovikov
ϕ(x, w¯n) must follow from Ψij (x, w¯n). But in this case we will haveM,a, b¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n)
as well. So ϕ(x, w¯n) is logically equivalent to Ψi1(x, w¯n)∨. . . ,∨Ψin(x, w¯n) but the latter
formula, being a disjunction of conjunctions of standard x-translations of intuitionistic
formulas is itself a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula and so we are
done.
If, on the other hand, one can take two complete (ϕ, (x, w¯n), k + 2)-conjunctions
Ψ(x, w¯n),Ψ
′(x, w¯n) such that Ψ
′(x, w¯n) |= Ψ(x, w¯n), and formulas Ψ(x, w¯n)∧ϕ(x, w¯n)
and Ψ′(x, w¯n) ∧ ¬ϕ(x, w¯n) are satisfiable, we reason as follows.
Take any n-ary evaluation Σϕ-point (M,a, b¯n) such that bothM,a, b¯n |= Ψ(x, w¯n)∧ϕ(x, w¯n)
and for any (Σϕ, (x, w¯n), k)-formula ψ(x, w¯n), if ψ(x, w¯n) is a standard x-translation
of an intuitionistic formula and M,a, b¯n |= ψ(x, w¯n), then Ψ(x, w¯n) |= ψ(x, w¯n). Then
take any n-ary evaluation Σϕ-point (N, c, d¯n) such thatN, c, d¯n |= Ψ
′(x, w¯n)∧¬ϕ(x, w¯n).
We can construct a 〈(M,a, b¯n), (N, c, d¯n)〉k-asimulation and thus obtain a contra-
diction in the following way.
Let α, β ∈ {M,N } and let (a¯′m, a
′, b¯′l) ∈ (D(α)
m+1×D(α)l) and (c¯′m, c
′; d¯′l) ∈ (D(β)
m+1×D(β)n).
Then (a¯′m, a
′; b¯′l)A(c¯′m, c
′; d¯′l) iff
m+ l ≤ n+ k ∧ (α, a′, b¯′l) ≤ϕ,l,n+k+2−m−l (β, c
′, d¯′l).
By the choice of Ψ(x, w¯n),Ψ
′(x, w¯n) and the independence of truth at an n-ary
evaluation point from the choice of free variables in a formula we obviously have
(a; b¯n)A(c; d¯n). It remains to verify conditions (1)–(4) of Definition 1.
Verification of (1). Since the degree of any atomic formula is 0, and the above condi-
tion implies that n+k+2−m−l ≥ 2, it is evident that for any (a¯′m, a
′; b¯′l)A(c¯′m, c
′; d¯′l)
and any predicate letter P ∈ Σϕ\{R
2, E2 } we have α, a′, b¯′l |= P (x, w¯l)⇒ β, c
′, d¯′l |= P (x, w¯l).
Verification of (2). Assume then that for some (a¯′m, a
′; b¯′l)A(c¯′m, c
′; d¯′l) such that
m+ l < n+ k there exists a c′′ ∈ D(β) such that c′Rβc′′. In this case we will also have
m+ 1 + l ≤ n+ k.
Then consider the following two sets:
Γ = {ST (i(w¯l), x) | ST (i(w¯l), x) is a (Σϕ, (x, w¯l), n+ k + 1−m− l)-formula, β, c
′′, d¯′l |= ST (i(w¯l), x) };
∆ = {ST (i(w¯l), x) | ST (i(w¯l), x) is a (Σϕ, (x, w¯l), n+ k + 1−m− l)-formula, β, c
′′, d¯′l |= ¬ST (i(w¯l), x) }.
These sets are non-empty, since by our assumption we have n + k + 1 − m − l ≥ 1.
Therefore, as we have r(ST (⊥, x)) = 0 and r(ST (⊥ → ⊥, x)) = 1, we will also
have ST (⊥, x) ∈ ∆ and ST (⊥ → ⊥, x) ∈ Γ. Then, according to our Lemma 2,
there are finite non-empty sets of logical equivalents for both Γ and ∆. Choosing
these finite sets, we in fact choose some finite {ST (i1(w¯l), x) . . . ST (it(w¯l), x) } ⊆ Γ,
{ST (j1(w¯l), x) . . . ST (ju(w¯l), x) } ⊆ ∆ such that
∀ψ(x, w¯l) ∈ Γ(ST (i1(w¯l), x) ∧ . . . ∧ ST (it(w¯l), x) |= ψ(x, w¯l));
∀χ(x, w¯l) ∈ ∆(χ(x, w¯l) |= ST (j1(w¯l), x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST (ju(w¯l), x)).
But then we obtain that the formula
ST ((i1(w¯l) ∧ . . . ∧ it(w¯l))→ (j1(w¯l) ∨ . . . ∨ ju(w¯l)), x)
is false at (β, c′, d¯′l). In fact, c
′′ disproves this implication for (β, c′, d¯′l). But every for-
mula both in {ST (i1(w¯l), x) . . . ST (it(w¯l), x) } and {ST (j1(w¯l), x) . . . ST (ju(w¯l), x) }
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is, by their choice, a (Σϕ, x, n + k + 1 −m − l)-formula, and so standard translation
of the implication under consideration must be a (Σϕ, x, n + k + 2 −m − l)-formula.
Note, further, that by (a¯′m, a
′; b¯′l)A(c¯′m, c
′; d¯′l) we must have
(α, a′, b¯′l) ≤ϕ,l,n+k+2−m−l (β, c
′, d¯′l),
and therefore this implication must be false at (α, a′, b¯′l) as well. But then take
any a′′ such that a′Rαa′′ and (α, a′′, b¯′l) verifies the conjunction in the antecedent
of the formula but falsifies its consequent. We must conclude then, by the choice of
{ST (i1(w¯l), x) . . . ST (it(w¯l), x) }, that α, a
′′, b¯′l |= Γ and so, by the definition of A,
and given that m+ l + 1 ≤ n + k, that (c¯′m, c
′, c′′; d¯′l)A(a¯′m, a
′, a′′; b¯′l). Since, in ad-
dition, (α, a′′, b¯′l) disproves every formula from {ST (j1(w¯l), x) . . . ST (ju(w¯l), x) } then
by the choice of this set we must conclude that every (Σϕ, x, n+k+1−m− l)-formula
that is a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula false at (β, c′, d¯′l) is also
false at (α, a′′, b¯′l). But then, again by the definition of A, and given the fact that
m+ l+1 ≤ n+ k, we must also have (a¯′m, a
′, a′′; b¯′l)A(c¯′m, c
′, c′′; d¯′l), and so condition
(2) holds.
Verification of (3). Assume then that for some (a¯′m, a
′; b¯′l)A(c¯′m, c
′; d¯′l) such that
m+ l < n+ k there exists a b′′ ∈ D(α) such that Eα(a′, b′′). In this case we will also
have m+ l + 1 ≤ n+ k.
Then consider the following set:
Γ = {ST (i(w¯l, w
′), x) | ST (i, x) is a (Σϕ, (x, w¯l, w
′), n+ k + 1−m− l)-formula, β, a′, b¯′l, b
′′ |= ST (i(w¯l, w
′), x) }.
This set is non-empty, since by our assumption we have n+k+1−m−l ≥ 1. Therefore,
as we have r(ST (⊥ → ⊥, x)) = 1, we will also have ST (⊥ → ⊥, x) ∈ Γ. Then, accord-
ing to our Lemma 2, there is a finite non-empty set of logical equivalents for Γ. Choosing
this finite set, we in fact choose some finite {ST (i1(w¯l, w
′), x) . . . ST (it(w¯l, w
′), x) } ⊆ Γ
such that
∀ψ(x, w¯l, w
′) ∈ Γ(ST (i1(w¯l, w
′), x) ∧ . . . ∧ ST (it(w¯l, w
′), x) |= ψ(x, w¯l, w
′)).
But then we obtain that the formula
ST (∃w′(i1(w¯l, w
′) ∧ . . . ∧ it(w¯l, w
′)), x)
is true at (α, a′, b¯′l). Moreover, every formula in {ST (i1(w¯l, w
′), x) . . . ST (it(w¯l, w
′), x) }
is, by their choice, a (Σϕ, x, n+k+1−m−l)-formula, and so standard translation of the
quantified conjunction under consideration must be a (Σϕ, x, n+k+2−m− l)-formula.
Since we have, by (a¯′m, a
′; b¯′l)A(c¯′m, c
′; d¯′l), that
(α, a′, b¯′l) ≤ϕ,l,n+k+2−m−l (β, c
′, d¯′l),
then the formula in question must be true at (β, c′, d¯′l) as well. But then take any
d′′ such that Eβ(c′, d′′) and (β, c′, d¯′l, d
′′) verifies a standard translation of the con-
junction after the existential quantifier. We must conclude then, by the choice of
{ST (i1(w¯l, w
′), x) . . . ST (it(w¯l, w
′), x) }, that β, c′, d¯′l, d
′′ |= Γ and so, by the definition
of A, and given that m+ l + 1 ≤ n+ k, that (a¯′m, a
′; b¯′l, b
′′)A(c¯′m, c
′; d¯′l, d
′′).
Verification of (4). Assume then that for some (a¯′m, a
′, b¯′l)A(c¯′m, c
′, d¯′l) such that
m+l+1 < n+k there exist some c′′, d′′ ∈ D(β) such that c′Rβc′′∧Eβ(c′′, d′′), but there
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are no a′′, b′′ ∈ D(α) such that a′Rαa′′∧Eα(a′′, b′′) and (a¯′m, a
′, a′′; b¯′l, b
′′)A(c¯′m, c
′, c′′; d¯′l, d
′′).
In this case we will have m+ 1 + l + 1 ≤ n+ k.
Then consider the following set:
∆ = {ST (i(w¯l, w
′), x) | ST (i(w¯l, w
′), x) is a (Σϕ, (x, w¯l, w
′), n+ k −m− l)-formula, β, c′′, d¯′l, d
′′ |= ¬ST (i(w¯l, w
′), x) }.
This set is non-empty, since by our assumption we have n+ k −m− l ≥ 0. Therefore,
as we have r(ST (⊥, x)) = 0, we will also have ST (⊥, x) ∈ ∆. Then, according to our
Lemma 2, there is a finite non-empty set of logical equivalents for ∆. Choosing this
finite set, we in fact choose some finite {ST (j1(w¯l, w
′), x) . . . ST (ju(w¯l, w
′), x) } ⊆ ∆
such that
∀χ(x, w¯l, w
′) ∈ ∆(χ(x, w¯l, w
′) |= ST (j1(w¯l, w
′), x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST (ju(w¯l, w
′), x)).
But then we obtain that the formula
ST (∀w′(j1(w¯l, w
′) ∨ . . . ∨ ju(w¯l, w
′)), x)
is false at (β, c′, d¯′l). In fact, c
′′, d′′ jointly disprove standard translation of this univer-
sally quantified disjunction for (β, c′, d¯′l). Further, every formula in {ST (j1(w¯l), x) . . . ST (ju(w¯l), x) }
is, by their choice, a (Σϕ, x, n+ k−m− l)-formula, and so standard translation of the
universally quantified disjunction under consideration must be a (Σϕ, x, n+k+2−m−l)-
formula. Since we have, by (a¯′m, a
′; b¯′l)A(c¯′m, c
′; d¯′l), that
(α, a′, b¯′l) ≤ϕ,l,n+k+2−m−l (β, c
′, d¯′l),
then the formula in question must be false at (α, a′, b¯′l) as well. But then take any a
′′, b′′
for which we have a′Rαa′′ and Eα(a′′, b′′) such that (α, a′′, b¯′l, b
′′) falsifies standard
translation of the disjunction after the quantifier. We must conclude, by the choice
of {ST (j1(w¯l, w
′), x) . . . ST (ju(w¯l, w
′), x) }, that every (Σϕ, x, n + k −m − l)-formula
that is a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula false at (β, c′′, d¯′l, d
′′) is
also false at (α, a′′, b¯′l, b
′′). But then, again by the definition of A, and given the fact
that m+ 1 + l + 1 ≤ n+ k, we must also have (a¯′m, a
′, a′′; b¯′l, b
′′)A(c¯′m, c
′, c′′; d¯′l, d
′′),
so condition (4) is satisfied.
Theorem 2. A formula ϕ(x, w¯n) is equivalent to a standard x-translation of an intu-
itionistic formula iff there exists k ∈ N such that ϕ(x, w¯n) is invariant with respect to
k-asimulations.
Proof. Let ϕ(x, w¯n) be equivalent to ST (i(w¯n), x). Then by Corollary 1, ST (i(w¯n), x)
is invariant with respect to r(ST (i(w¯n), x))-asimulations, and, therefore, so is ϕ(x, w¯n).
In the other direction, let ϕ(x, w¯n) be invariant with respect to k-asimulations for some
k. If k ≤ r(ϕ(x, w¯n)), then every r(ϕ(x, w¯n))-asimulation is a k-asimulation, therefore,
ϕ(x, w¯n) is invariant with respect to r(ϕ(x, w¯n))-asimulations, and so, by Theorem 1,
ϕ(x, w¯n) is logically equivalent to a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula.
If, on the other hand, r(ϕ(x, w¯n)) < k, then set l = k − r(ϕ(x, w¯n)) and consider a
sequence y¯l of variables not occurring in ϕ(x, w¯n). Formula ∀y¯lϕ(x, w¯n) is logically
equivalent to ϕ(x, w¯n), hence ∀y¯lϕ(x, w¯n) is invariant with respect to k-asimulations
as well. But we have r(∀y¯lϕ(x, w¯n)) = k, so, by Theorem 1, ∀y¯lϕ(x, w¯n) is logically
equivalent to a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula. Hence ϕ(x, w¯n) is
equivalent to this translation, too.
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3 The main result
We begin by introducing a somewhat simpler, unparametrized version of asimula-
tion:
Definition 4. Let (M,a, b¯n), (N, c, d¯n) be two n-ary evaluation Θ-points. A binary
relation
A ⊆
⋃
n≥0
(((D(M)×D(M)n)×(D(N)×D(N)n))∪((D(N)×D(N)n)×(D(M)×D(M)n))),
is called 〈(M,a, b¯n), (N, c, d¯n)〉-asimulation iff (a; b¯n)A(c; d¯n) and for any α, β ∈ {M,N },
any (a′; b¯′l) ∈ D(α)×D(α)
l, (c′; d¯′l) ∈ D(β)×D(β)
l, whenever we have (a′; b¯′l)A(c
′; d¯′l),
the following conditions hold:
∀P ∈ Θ \ {R2, E2 }(α, a′, b¯′l |= P (x, w¯l)⇒ β, c
′, d¯′l |= P (x, w¯l)) (76)
(c′′ ∈ D(β) ∧ c′Rβc′′)⇒
⇒ ∃a′′ ∈ D(α)(a′Rαa′′ ∧ (c′′; d¯′l)Aˆ(a
′′; b¯′l)); (77)
(b′′ ∈ D(α) ∧ Eα(a′, b′′))⇒
⇒ ∃d′′ ∈ D(β)(Eβ(c′, d′′) ∧ (a′; b¯′l, b
′′)A(c′; d¯′l, d
′′)); (78)
(c′′, d′′ ∈ D(β) ∧ c′Rβc′′ ∧ Eβ(c′′, d′′))⇒
⇒ ∃a′′, b′′ ∈ D(α)(a′Rαa′′ ∧ Eα(a′′, b′′) ∧ (a′′; b¯′l, b
′′)A(c′′; d¯′l, d
′′)). (79)
Lemma 5. Let A be an 〈(M,a, b¯n), (N, c, d¯n)〉-asimulation, and let
A′ = { 〈(a¯′m, a
′; b¯′l), (c¯′m, c
′; d¯′l)〉 | (a
′; b¯′l)A(c
′; d¯′l) }.
Then A′ is an 〈(M,a, b¯n), (N, c, d¯n)〉k-asimulation for any k ∈ N.
Proof. We obviously have (a; b¯n)A
′(c; d¯n), and since for any α, β ∈ {M,N }, and
any (a¯′m, a
′; b¯′l) in D(α)
m+1 × D(α)l, (c¯′m, c
′; d¯′l) in D(β)
m+1 × D(β)l such that
(a¯′m, a
′; b¯′l)A
′(c¯′m, c
′; d¯′l) we have (a
′; b¯′l)A(c
′; d¯′l), condition (1) for A
′ follows from
the fulfilment of condition (76) for A. So it remains to verify that the other three
conditions hold for A′ for every k.
Condition (2): If (a¯′m, a
′; b¯′l)A
′(c¯′m, c
′; d¯′l) then (a
′; b¯′l)A(c
′; d¯′l), and if, further,
c′′ ∈ D(β) and c′Rβc′′ then by condition (77) we can choose a′′ ∈ D(α) such that
a′Rαa′′, and (c′′; d¯′l)Aˆ(a
′′; b¯′l). But then, by definition ofA
′ we will also have (c¯′m, c
′, c′′; d¯′l)Aˆ′(a¯′m, a
′, a′′; b¯′l).
Condition (3): If (a¯′m, a
′; b¯′l)A
′(c¯′m, c
′; d¯′l) then (a
′; b¯′l)A(c
′; d¯′l), and if, further,
b′′ ∈ D(α) and Eα(a′, b′′) then by condition (78) we can choose d′′ ∈ D(β) such that
Eβ(c′, d′′), and (a′; b¯′l, b
′′)A(c′; d¯′l, d
′′). But then, by definition of A′ we will also have
(a¯′m, a
′; b¯′l, b
′′)A′(c¯′m, c
′; d¯′l, d
′′).
Condition (4): If (a¯′m, a
′; b¯′l)A
′(c¯′m, c
′; d¯′l) then (a
′; b¯′l)A(c
′; d¯′l), and if, further,
c′′, d′′ ∈ D(β), c′Rβc′′ andEβ(c′′, d′′) then by condition (79) we can choose a′′, b′′ ∈ D(α)
such that a′Rβa′′, Eα(a′′, b′′), and (a′′; b¯′l, b
′′)A(c′′; d¯′l, d
′′). But then, by definition of
A′ we will also have (a¯′m, a
′, a′′; b¯′l, b
′′)A′(c¯′m, c
′, c′′; d¯′l, d
′′).
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Definition 5. A formula ϕ(x, w¯n) is invariant with respect to asimulations iff for
any Θ such that Σϕ ⊆ Θ, any n-ary evaluation Θ-points (M,a, b¯n) and (N, c, d¯n),
if there exists an 〈(M,a, b¯n), (N, c, d¯n)〉-asimulation A and M,a, b¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n), then
N, c, d¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n).
Corollary 2. If ϕ(x, w¯n) is equivalent to a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic
formula, then ϕ(x, w¯n) is invariant with respect to asimulations.
Proof. Let ϕ(x, w¯n) be not invariant with respect to asimulations, and let A be an
〈(M,a, b¯n), (N, c, d¯n)〉-asimulation such thatM,a, b¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n), but notN, c, d¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n).
Let A′ be defined as in Lemma 5. Then by this Lemma A′ is an 〈(M,a, b¯n), (N, c, d¯n)〉k-
asimulation for any k ∈ N. Hence, by Theorem 2, ϕ(x, w¯n) cannot be equivalent to a
standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula.
To proceed further, we need to introduce some notions and results from classical
model theory. For a model M and a¯n ∈ D(M) let [M, a¯n] be the extension of M
with a¯n as new individual constants denoting themselves. It is easy to see that there
is a simple relation between truth of a formula at a Θ-evaluation point and truth of
its substitution instance in an extension of the above-mentioned kind; namely, for any
Θ-model M , every Θ-formula ϕ(y¯n, w¯m) and any a¯n, b¯m ∈ D(M) it holds that:
[M, a¯n], b¯m |= ϕ(a¯n, w¯m)⇔M, a¯n, b¯m |= ϕ(y¯n, w¯m).
We will call a theory of M (and write Th(M)) the set of all first-order sentences
true atM . We will call an n-type ofM a set of formulas Γ(w¯n) consistent with Th(M).
Definition 6. Let M be a Θ-model. M is ω-saturated iff for all k ∈ N and for all
a¯n ∈ D(M), every k-type Γ(w¯k) of [M, a¯n] is satisfiable in [M, a¯n].
Definition of ω-saturation normally requires satisfiability of 1-types only. How-
ever, our modification is equivalent to the more familiar version: see e.g. [Doets 1996,
Lemma 4.31, p. 73].
It is known that every model can be elementarily extended to an ω-saturated model;
in other words, the following lemma holds:
Lemma 6. Let M be a Θ-model. Then there is an ω-saturated extension N of M such
that for all a¯n ∈ D(M) and every Θ-formula ϕ(w¯n):
M, a¯n |= ϕ(w¯n)⇔ N, a¯n |= ϕ(w¯n).
The latter lemma is a trivial corollary of e.g. [Chang et al. 1973, Lemma 5.1.14, p.
216].
In what follows we adopt the following notation for the fact that for any x all Θ-
formulas that are standard x-translations of intuitionistic formulas true at (M,a, b¯n),
are also true at (N, c, d¯n):
(M,a, b¯n) ≤Θ (N, c, d¯n).
Lemma 7. Let Θ ⊆ Σ, letM , N be ω-saturated Θ-models and let (M,a, b¯n) ≤Θ (N, c, d¯n).
Then relation A such that for any α, β ∈ {M,N }, any (a′; b¯′l) ∈ D(α) × D(α)
l,
(c′; d¯′l) ∈ D(β) ×D(β)
l
(a′; b¯′l)A(c
′; d¯′l)⇔ (α, a
′, b¯′l) ≤Θ (β, c
′, d¯′l)
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is an 〈(M,a, b¯n), (N, c, d¯n)〉-asimulation.
1
Proof. Throughout this proof every formula mentioned is supposed to be a Θ-formula.
It is obvious that (a; b¯n)A(c; d¯n), and since for any predicate letter P distinct from
R2, E2 and variables x, w¯n formula P (x, w¯n) is a standard x-translation of an atomic
intuitionistic formula, condition (76) is trivially satisfied for A.
To verify condition (77), choose any α, β ∈ {M,N }, any (a′; b¯′l) ∈ D(α) ×D(α)
l,
(c′; d¯′l) ∈ D(β) ×D(β)
l such that (α, a′, b¯′l) ≤Θ (β, c
′, d¯′l) and choose any c
′′ ∈ D(β)
for which we have c′Rβc′′.
Then choose any variables x, w¯n and consider the following two sets:
Γ = { i(w¯l) | β, c
′′, d¯′l |= ST (i(w¯l), x) };
∆ = { i(w¯l) | β, c
′′, d¯′l |= ¬ST (i(w¯l), x) }.
We have by the choice of Γ, ∆ that for every finite Γ′ ⊆ Γ and ∆′ ⊆ ∆ the formula
ST (
∧
(Γ′) →
∨
(∆′), x) is disproved by c′′ for (β, c′, d¯′l). So, by our premise that
(α, a′, b¯′l) ≤Θ (β, c
′, d¯′l), the standard translation of every such implication must be
false at (α, a′, b¯′l) as well. This means that every finite subset of the set
{R(a′, x) } ∪ {ST (i(b¯′l), x) | i(w¯l) ∈ Γ } ∪ {¬ST (i(b¯′l), x) | i(w¯l) ∈ ∆ }
is satisfiable at [α, a′, b¯′l]. (We set ∆
′ = {ST (⊥, x) } if the finite set in question has an
empty intersection with ∆ and Γ′ = {ST (⊥ → ⊥, x) } if it has an empty intersection
with Γ.) Therefore, by compactness of first-order logic, this set is consistent with
Th([α, a′, b¯′l]) and, by ω-saturation of both M and N it must be satisfied in [α, a
′, b¯′l]
by some a′′ ∈ D(α). So for any such a′′ we will have a′Rαa′′ and, moreover
α, a′′, b¯′l |= {ST (i(w¯l), x) | i(w¯l) ∈ Γ } ∪ {¬ST (i(w¯l), x) | i(w¯l) ∈ ∆ }.
Thus, by choice of Γ and ∆ plus independence of truth at a pointed model from the
choice of free variables in a formula we will have both (α, a′′, b¯′l) ≤Θ (β, c
′′, d¯′l) and
(β, c′′, d¯′l) ≤Θ (α, a
′′, b¯′l) and condition (77) is verified.
To verify condition (78), choose any α, β ∈ {M,N }, any (a′; b¯′l) ∈ D(α) ×D(α)
l,
(c′; d¯′l) ∈ D(β) ×D(β)
l such that (α, a′, b¯′l) ≤Θ (β, c
′, d¯′l) and choose any b
′′ ∈ D(α)
for which we have Eα(a′, b′′).
Then choose any variables x, w¯n, w
′ and consider the following set:
Γ = { i(w¯l, w
′) | α, a′, b¯′l, b
′′ |= ST (i(w¯l, w
′), x) }.
We have by the choice of Γ that for every finite Γ′ ⊆ Γ the formula ST (∃w′
∧
(Γ′), x)
is verified by b′′ for (α, a′, b¯′l). So, by our premise that (α, a
′, b¯′l) ≤Θ (β, c
′, d¯′l), the
standard translation of every such quantified conjunction must be true at (β, c′, d¯′l) as
well. This means that every finite subset of the set
{E(c′, w′) } ∪ {ST (i(d¯′l, w
′), c′) | i(w¯l, w
′) ∈ Γ }
is satisfiable at [β, c′, d¯′l]. Therefore, by compactness of first-order logic, this set is
consistent with Th([β, c′, d¯′l]) and, by ω-saturation of both M and N , it must be
1This definition of A makes sense only when D(M) ∩ D(N) = ∅. However, the latter can always
be assumed without a loss of generality.
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satisfied in [β, c′, d¯′l] by some d
′′ ∈ D(β). So for any such d′′ we will have Eβ(c′, d′′)
and, moreover
β, c′, d¯′l, d
′′ |= {ST (i(w¯l, w
′), x) | i(w¯l, w
′) ∈ Γ }.
Thus, by choice of Γ plus independence of truth at a pointed model from the choice of
free variables in a formula we will have (α, a′, b¯′l, b
′′) ≤Θ (β, c
′, d¯′l, d
′′) and condition
(78) is verified.
To verify condition (79), choose any α, β ∈ {M,N }, any (a′; b¯′l) ∈ D(α) ×D(α)
l,
(c′; d¯′l) ∈ D(β)×D(β)
l such that (α, a′, b¯′l) ≤Θ (β, c
′, d¯′l) and choose any c
′′, d′′ ∈ D(β)
for which we have c′Rβc′′ and Eβ(c′′, d′′).
Then choose any variables x, w¯n, w
′ and consider the following set:
∆ = { i(w¯l, w
′) | β, c′′, d¯′l, d
′′ |= ¬ST (i(w¯l, w
′), x) }.
We have by the choice of ∆ that for every finite ∆′ ⊆ ∆ the formula ST (∀w′
∨
(∆′), x)
is disproved by c′′, d′′ for (β, c′, d¯′l). So, by our premise that (a
′; b¯′l) ≤Θ (c
′; d¯′l), the
standard translation of every such quantified disjunction must be false at (α, a′, b¯′l) as
well. This means that every finite subset of the set
{R(a′, x), E(x,w′) } ∪ {¬ST (i(b¯′l, w
′), x) | i(w¯l, w
′) ∈ ∆ }
is satisfiable at [α, a′, b¯′l]. Therefore, by compactness of first-order logic, this set is
consistent with Th([α, a′, b¯′l]) and, by ω-saturation of both M and N , it must be
satisfied in [α, a′, b¯′l] by some a
′′, b′′ ∈ D(α). So for any such a′′ and b′′ we will have
a′Rαa′′, Eα(a′′, b′′) and, moreover
α, a′′, b¯′l, b
′′ |= {¬ST (i(w¯l, w
′), x) | i(w¯l, w
′) ∈ ∆ }.
Thus, by choice of ∆ plus independence of truth at a pointed model from the choice of
free variables in a formula we will have (α, a′′, b¯′l, b
′′) ≤Θ (β, c
′′, d¯′l, d
′′) and condition
(79) is verified.
We are prepared now to state and prove our main result.
Theorem 3. Let ϕ(x, w¯n) be invariant with respect to asimulations. Then ϕ(x, w¯n) is
equivalent to a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula.
Proof. We may assume that ϕ(x, w¯n) is satisfiable, for ⊥ is clearly invariant with re-
spect to asimulations and ⊥ ↔ ST (⊥, x) is a valid formula. In what follows we will
write IC(ϕ(x, w¯n)) for the set of Σϕ-formulas in variables x, w¯n that are standard
x-translations of intuitionistic formulas following from ϕ(x, w¯n)). For any n-ary evalu-
ation Σϕ-point (M,a, b¯n) we will denote the set of Σϕ-formulas in variables x, w¯n that
are standard x-translations of intuitionistic formulas true at (M,a, b¯n), or intuitionistic
Σϕ-theory of (M,a, b¯n) by ITϕ(M,a, b¯n). It is obvious that for any n-ary evaluation
Σϕ-points (M,a, b¯n) and (N, c, d¯n) we will have (M,a, b¯n) ≤Σϕ (N, c, d¯n) if and only if
ITϕ(M,a, b¯n) ⊆ ITϕ(N, c, d¯n).
Our strategy will be to show that IC(ϕ(x, w¯n)) |= ϕ(x, w¯n). Once this is done we
will apply compactness of first-order logic and conclude that ϕ(x, w¯n) is equivalent to
a finite conjunction of standard x-translations of intuitionistic formulas and hence to
a standard x-translation of the corresponding intuitionistic conjunction.
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To show this, take any n-ary evaluation Σϕ-point (M,a, b¯n) such thatM,a, b¯n |= IC(ϕ(x, w¯n)).
Such a model exists, because ϕ(x, w¯n) is satisfiable and IC(ϕ(x, w¯n)) will be satisfied
in any pointed model satisfying ϕ(x, w¯n). Then we can also choose an n-ary evaluation
Σϕ-point (N, c, d¯n) such that N, c, d¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n) and ITϕ(N, c, d¯n) ⊆ ITϕ(M,a, b¯n).
For suppose otherwise. Then for any n-ary evaluation Σϕ-point (N, c, d¯n) such that
N, c, d¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n) we can choose an intuitionistic formula i(N,c,d¯n)(w¯n) such that
ST (i(N,c,d¯n)(w¯n), x) is a Σϕ-formula true at (N, c, d¯n) but not at (M,a, b¯n). Then
consider the set
S = {ϕ(x, w¯n) } ∪ {¬ST (i(N,c,d¯n)(w¯n), x) | N, c, d¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n) }
Let {ϕ(x, w¯n),¬ST (i1(w¯n), x) . . . ,¬ST (iu(w¯n), x) } be a finite subset of this set. If this
set is unsatisfiable, then we must have ϕ(x) |= ST (i1(w¯n), x)∨ . . .∨ST (iu(w¯n), x), but
then we will also have (ST (i1(w¯n), x)∨. . .∨ST (iu(w¯n), x)) ∈ IC(ϕ(x, w¯n)) ⊆ ITϕ(M,a, b¯n),
and hence (ST (i(N1,b1), x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST (i(Nu,bu), x)) will be true at (M,a, b¯n). But then
at least one of ST (i1(w¯n), x) . . . , ST (iu(w¯n), x) must also be true at (M,a, b¯n), which
contradicts the choice of these formulas. Therefore, every finite subset of S is satisfi-
able, and by compactness S itself is satisfiable as well. But then take any pointed
Σϕ-model (N
′, c′, d¯′n) of S and this will be a model for which we will have both
N ′, c′, d¯′n |= ST (i(N ′,c′,d¯′n)(w¯n), x) by choice of i(N ′,c′,d¯′n) andN
′, c′, d¯′n |= ¬ST (i(N ′,c′,d¯′n)(w¯n), x)
by the satisfaction of S, a contradiction.
Therefore, we will assume in the following that (M,a, b¯n), (N, c, d¯n) are n-ary evalu-
ation Σϕ-points,M,a, b¯n |= IC(ϕ(x, w¯n)), N, c, d¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n), and ITϕ(N, c, d¯n) ⊆ ITϕ(M,a, b¯n).
Then, according to Lemma 6, consider ω-saturated elementary extensions M ′, N ′ of
M and N , respectively. We have:
M,a, b¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n)⇔M
′, a, b¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n) (80)
N ′, c, d¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n) (81)
Also since M ′, N ′ are elementarily equivalent to M , N we have
ITϕ(N
′, c, d¯n) = ITϕ(N, c, d¯n) ⊆ ITϕ(M,a, b¯n) = ITϕ(M
′, a, b¯n).
But then we have (N ′, c, d¯n) ≤Σϕ (M
′, a, b¯n), and, by ω-saturation of M
′, N ′, relation
A as defined in Lemma 7 is an 〈(N ′, c, d¯n), (M
′, a, b¯n)〉-asimulation. But then by (81)
and asimulation invariance of ϕ(x, w¯n) we get M
′, a, b¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n), and further, by
(80) we conclude that M,a, b¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n). Therefore, ϕ(x, w¯n) in fact follows from
IC(ϕ(x, w¯n)).
The following theorem is an immediate consequence of Corollary 2 and Theorem 3:
Theorem 4. A formula ϕ(x, w¯n) is invariant with respect to asimulations iff it is
equivalent to a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula.
4 Criteria for first-order definable classes
Theorem 4 stated above establishes a criterion for the equivalence of first-order for-
mula to a standard translation of intuitionistic formula on arbitrary first-order models.
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But one may have a special interest in a proper subclass K of the class of first-order
models viewing the models which are not in this subclass as irrelevant, non-intended
etc. In this case one may be interested in the criterion for equivalence of a given
first-order formula to a standard translation of an intuitionistic predicate formula over
this particular subclass. It turns out that if some parts of this subclass are first-order
axiomatizable then only a slight modification of our general criterion is necessary to
solve this problem.
To tighten up on terminology, we introduce the following definitions:
Definition 7. Let K be a class of models. Then:
1. K(Θ) = {M ∈ K | K is a Θ-model };
2. K(Θ) is first-order axiomatizable iff there is a set Ax of Θ-sentences, such that
a Θ-model M is in K iff M |= Ax;
3. A set Γ of Θ-formulas is K-satisfiable iff Γ is satisfied by some model in K;
4. A Θ-formula ϕ K-follows from Γ (Γ |=K ϕ) iff Γ ∪ {ϕ } is K-unsatisfiable;
5. Θ-formulas ϕ and ψ are K-equivalent iff ϕ |=K ψ and ψ |=K ϕ.
It is clear that for any class K, such that Ax first-order axiomatizes K(Θ), any set
Γ of Θ-formulas and any Θ-formula ϕ, Γ is K-satisfiable iff Γ ∪ Ax is satisfiable, and
Γ |=K ϕ iff Γ ∪ Ax |= ϕ.
Definition 8. A formula ϕ(x, w¯n) is K-invariant with respect to asimulations iff for
any Θ such that Σϕ ⊆ Θ, any n-ary evaluation Θ-points (M,a, b¯n) and (N, c, d¯n), if
M,N ∈ K, there exists an 〈(M,a, b¯n), (N, c, d¯n)〉-asimulation A, andM,a, b¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n),
then N, c, d¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n).
Now for the criterion of K-equivalence:
Theorem 5. Let K be a class of first-order models such that K(Θ) is first-order axiom-
atizablefor any finite Θ, and let ϕ(x, w¯n) be K-invariant with respect to asimulations.
Then ϕ(x, w¯n) is K-equivalent to a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula.
Proof. Let Axϕ be the set of first-order sentences that axiomatizesK(Σϕ). We may as-
sume that ϕ(x, w¯n) isK(Σϕ)-satisfiable, otherwise ϕ(x, w¯n) isK-equivalent to ST (⊥, x)
and we are done. In what follows we will write KC(ϕ(x, w¯n)) for the set of Σϕ-formulas
in variables x, w¯n that are standard x-translations of intuitionistic formulasK-following
from ϕ(x, w¯n).
Our strategy will be to show that KC(ϕ(x, w¯n)) |=K ϕ(x, w¯n). Once this is done
we will conclude that
Axϕ ∪KC(ϕ(x, w¯n)) |= ϕ(x, w¯n).
Then we apply compactness of first-order logic and conclude that ϕ(x, w¯n) is equivalent
to a finite conjunction ψ1(x, w¯n)∧ . . .∧ψm(x, w¯n) of formulas from this set. But it fol-
lows then that ϕ(x, w¯n) isK-equivalent to the conjunction of the setKC(ϕ(x))∩{ψ1(x, w¯n) . . . , ψm(x, w¯n) }.
In fact, by our choice of KC(ϕ(x, w¯n)) we have
ϕ(x, w¯n) |=K
∧
(KC(ϕ(x, w¯n)) ∩ {ψ1(x, w¯n) . . . , ψm(x, w¯n) }),
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And by our choice of ψ1(x, w¯n) . . . , ψm(x, , w¯n) we have
Axϕ ∪ (KC(ϕ(x, w¯n)) ∩ {ψ1(x, w¯n) . . . , ψm(x, w¯n) }) |= ϕ(x, w¯n)
and hence
KC(ϕ(x, w¯n)) ∩ {ψ1(x, w¯n) . . . , ψm(x, , w¯n) } |=K ϕ(x, w¯n).
To show that KC(ϕ(x, w¯n)) |=K ϕ(x, w¯n), take any n-ary evaluation Σϕ-point
(M,a, b¯n) such that M ∈ K and M,a, b¯n |= KC(ϕ(x, w¯n)). Such a model exists, be-
cause ϕ(x, w¯n) is K(Σϕ)-satisfiable and KC(ϕ(x, w¯n)) will be K-satisfied in any n-ary
evaluation Σϕ-point satisfying ϕ(x, w¯n). Then we can also choose an n-ary evaluation
Σϕ-point (N, c, d¯n) such thatN ∈ K andN, c, d¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n) and ITϕ(N, c, d¯n) ⊆ ITϕ(M,a, b¯n).
For suppose otherwise. Then for any Σϕ-model N ∈ K and any n-ary evaluation
Σϕ-point (N, c, d¯n) such that N, c, d¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n) we can choose an intuitionistic for-
mula i(N,c,d¯n)(w¯n) such that ST (i(N,c,d¯n)(w¯n), x) is a Σϕ-formula true at (N, c, d¯n) but
not at (M,a, b¯n). Then consider the set
S = {ϕ(x, w¯n) } ∪ {¬ST (i(N,c,d¯n)(w¯n), x) | N ∈ K ∧N, c, d¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n) }
Let {ϕ(x, w¯n),¬ST (i1(w¯n), x) . . . ,¬ST (iu(w¯n), x) } be a finite subset of this set. If
this set is K-unsatisfiable, then we must have
ϕ(x, w¯n) |=K ST (i1(w¯n), x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST (iu(w¯n), x),
but then we will also have
(ST (i1(w¯n), x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST (iu(w¯n), x)) ∈ KC(ϕ(x, w¯n)) ⊆ ITϕ(M,a, b¯n),
and hence (ST (i1(w¯n), x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST (iu(w¯n), x)) will be true at (M,a, b¯n). But then
at least one of ST (i1(w¯n), x) . . . , ST (iu(w¯n), x) must also be true at (M,a, b¯n), which
contradicts the choice of these formulas. Therefore, every finite subset of S is K-
satisfiable. But then every finite subset of the set S ∪ Axϕ is satisfiable as well. By
compactness of first-order logic S ∪Axϕ is satisfiable, hence S is satisfiable over K.
But then take any n-ary evaluation Σϕ-point (N
′, c′, d¯′n) satisfying S such that
N ′ ∈ K and this will be an evaluation point for which we will have bothN ′, c′, d¯′n |= ST (i(N ′,c′,d¯′n)(w¯n), x)
by choice of i(N ′,c′,d¯′n) and N
′, c′, d¯′n |= ¬ST (i(N ′,c′,d¯′n)(w¯n), x) by the satisfaction of
S, a contradiction.
Therefore, for any given n-ary evaluation Σϕ-point (M,a, b¯n) satisfyingKC(ϕ(x, w¯n))
such that M ∈ K we can choose an n-ary evaluation Σϕ-point (N, c, d¯n) such that
N ∈ K, N, c, d¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n) and ITϕ(N, c, d¯n) ⊆ ITϕ(M,a, b¯n). Then, reasoning ex-
actly as in the proof of Theorem 3, we conclude that M,a, b¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n). Therefore,
ϕ(x, w¯n) in fact K-follows from KC(ϕ(x, w¯n)).
Theorem 6. Let K be a class of first-order models such that for any finite Θ the class
K(Θ) is first-order axiomatizable. Then a formula ϕ(x, w¯n) is K-invariant with respect
to asimulations iff it is K-equivalent to a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic
formula.
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Proof. From left to right our theorem follows from Theorem 5. In the other direc-
tion, assume that ϕ(x, w¯n) is K-equivalent to ST (i(w¯n), x) and assume that for some
Θ such that Σϕ ⊆ Θ, some n-ary evaluation Θ-points (M,a, b¯n) and (N, c, d¯n) such that
M,N ∈ K, and some 〈(M,a, b¯n), (N, c, d¯n)〉-asimulationA we haveM,a, b¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n).
Then, by Corollary 2 we have N, c, d¯n |= ST (i(w¯n), x), but since ST (i(w¯n), x) is K-
equivalent to ϕ(x, w¯n) and N is in K, we also have N, c, d¯n |= ϕ(x, w¯n). Therefore,
ϕ(x, w¯n) is K-invariant with respect to asimulations.
One obvious instantiation for K would be the class of all intuitionistic models
which are normally viewed as intended models for intuitionistic predicate logic within
the framework of Kripke semantics. A first-order axiomatization for K(Θ) would be
RT ∪Mon ∪ ER ∪ Type, where:
RT = { ∀yR(y, y), ∀yzw((R(y, z)∧R(z, w))→ R(y, w)) };
Mon = { ∀yzw¯n((P (y, w¯n) ∧R(y, z))→ P (z, w¯n)) | P ∈ Θ \ {R } };
ER = { ∀x(∃yE(x, y)↔ ¬∃yE(y, x)), ∀xy(R(x, y)→ ∃zw(E(x, z) ∧ E(y, w))) };
Type = { ∀yz¯n(P (y, z¯n)→
n∧
i=1
(E(y, zi)) | P ∈ Θ \ {R } }.
Another instantiation for K might be, e.g. the class of intuitionistic models with
constant domains. In this case, if R2, E2 ∈ Θ, a first-order axiomatization for K(Θ) is
given by RT ∪Mon ∪ ER ∪ Type ∪ {CD }, where
CD = ∀x(∃yE(y, x)→ ∀yE(y, x)).
Thus our Theorem 6 yields, among others, a simple equivalence criterion for these
two particular classes of models.
5 Conclusion and further research
Theorems 2, 4, and 6 proved above show that the general idea of asimulation for
intuitionistic propositional logic is a faithful analogue of the idea of world-object bisim-
ulation for modal predicate logic in many important respects. However, in the pred-
icate case differences from the corresponding notion of bisimulation are much more
conspicuous than in the propositional case. Thus, if we introduced ‘asimulation games’
corresponding to the propositional version of asimulation defined in [Olkhovikov 2011]
(the main difference from propositional case being the absence of conditions (78) and
(79)) then, given the strength of condition (77) we would have these games indistin-
guishable from bisimulation games on the segment beginning from the first move of
Duplicator. Every link between worlds established by this player would have to be
symmetrical and the asymmetry of asimulation would be important only for the intial
pair of worlds.2 This does not hold in the predicate case. Here, depending on the strat-
egy chosen by Spoiler, the whole game might be played with the asymmetrical links
between sequences of world and objects; also asymmetry can be reinstated after the
2This asymmetry would also possibly lead to exclusion of some successors of the left world of the
link from the domain of the bisimulation game to follow.
players reach the first symmetrical link in the game, and the direction of asymmetry
can be switched by moves of the players. All these features show that specific features
of intuitionistic logic can be actualized within the setting of quantifiers and predicates
only, while on the propositional level one can find but mere rudiments and traces of
them.
One interesting further question lying beyond the scope of the present paper is the
status of the proofs presented above from the viewpoint of intuitionistic philosophy.
It is well-known that ω-saturated models whose existence is guaranteed by Lemma 6
might turn out to be uncountable. Hence our proof might be viewed by a hardcore
intuitionist as having no sense at all. As it happens, there is a way to give another
proof of our main result that looks more favorable to an intuitionistic eye. This proof
uses countable models only and employs the notion of recursive saturation instead of
saturation simpliciter. However, this variant of proof is also a little bit less clear and
more indirect, so we postpone its publication to another occasion.
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